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The way to stop discriminationon the basis of race is to stop
discriminatingon the basis of race.I
I. PREFACE
Race-based preferencing in federal contract procurement is part of a
larger governmental initiative colloquially known as "affirmative action."2
Affirmative action in the federal context originated under President Kennedy,
when he ordered the "Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity ...
immediately to scrutinize and study employment practices of the Government
of the United States, and to consider and recommend additional affirmative
steps which should be taken ... to realize more fully the national policy of
nondiscrimination."3 Black's Law Dictionary defines discrimination as "[t]he
effect of a law . .. that denies privileges to a certain class because of race, age,
sex, nationality, religion, or disability.'A Yet less than twenty years after
Kennedy's noble proclamation, Congress enacted legislation that denies federal
contracting opportunities to certain small businesses solely on the basis of their
racial composition: Section 8(a) and Section 8(d) of the Small Business Act
(the "Act").
II. INTRODUCTION

As currently written, two of the Small Business Administration's
federal contract procurement and acquisition programs, Section 8(a) 6 and
Section 8(d), 7 which are both largely race-based, are violative of both the due
process and the equal protection ensured to all Americans by the United States

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
Affirmative action is defined as "[a] set of actions designed to eliminate existing and
continuing discrimination, to remedy lingering effects of past discrimination, and to create
2

systems and procedures to prevent future discrimination." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 68 (9th ed.

2009). There have traditionally been three main focuses of affirmative action programs:
employment, education, and public contracting, the latter of which is the focus of this Note. For
further information on affirmative action, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work:
Diversity, Integration, andAffirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1 (2005) (discussing affirmative action in employment); Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things Up
to Their First Principles:Reflections on the Values ofAffirmative Action, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 1299
(1999) (general discussion of affirmative action); Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher
Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 381 (1998) (discussing affirmative action policies in secondary education).
Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1,977 (Mar. 6, 1961) (emphasis added).
4

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, 534.

6

Id. § 637(a).
Id. § 637(d).

15 U.S.C. §§ 631-657 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
7

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss2/11

2

Bogard: Presumed Disadvantaged: Constitutional Incongruit in Federal Cont

2012]

PRESUMED DISADVANTAGED

849

Constitution. In theory the Section 8(a) and Section 8(d) programs
("Programs") are designed to increase the participation of firms owned by
economically disadvantaged minorities in federal contracting, accomplished by
virtue of the inclusion of a plethora of racial groups qualified to participate.
However, in effect, because the list of racial minorities that are eligible for
participation is so expansive, the Programs merely discriminate against one
racially "distinct" group.
Part I of this Note will examine the historical and legal underpinnings
of race-based preferencing in federal contract procurement, which has
ultimately led to the current version of the Programs. This Part will detail the
origins of the federal government's contract procurement programs, including
the formation of the Small Business Administration ("SBA"), which is the
agency responsible for enforcing the legislation upon which this article is
focused. Furthermore, this Part will review the legislative and executive history
leading to the enactment of the legislation challenged herein.
Although reasonable minds may differ on when the genesis of racebased preferencing in federal contracting began, one appropriate point with
which to begin an analysis is the Roosevelt administration's issuance of
Executive Order 8802.9 This Order prohibited current and future discrimination
by the federal government, but notably had no remedial properties.10 Shortly
thereafter, Congress authorized creation of the Smaller War Plants Corporation,
which had authority to subcontract with small businesses."
The next major milestone in the federal government's fight to end
discrimination came with the promulgation of the Civil Rights Act of 196412
during the Johnson administration. Included in that massive and
groundbreaking legislation was Title VII, which was the first federal law
designed to protect citizens from employment discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.13 In hindsight, the aforementioned
actions, along with other legislative and executive acts, established the

To limit the scope of this Note, an in-depth review of the gender-based preferences in these
programs will not be provided because gender, unlike race, is a "quasi-suspect classification" and
a challenged law would therefore be reviewed under the less restrictive "intermediate scrutiny"
standard. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); see also Jason M. Skaggs,
Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States v. Virginia's "Exceedingly
PersuasiveJustification" Standard,86 CALIF. L. REv. 1169 (1998).
9
Exec. Order No. 8,802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3,109 (June 25, 1941).
10
Id
"

Small Business Mobilization Act, Pub. L. No. 77-603, 56 Stat. 351 (1942) (50 App. U.S.C.

§§ 1101-09, 1111 (omitted), § 1110 (transferred 12 U.S.C. § 265), § 1112 (repealed by 61 Stat.
449 (1947)).
12
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at Chapter 21 of 42 U.S.C.).
13
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
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foundation upon which the 1978 amendments to the Actl4 were enacted.
Among the 1978 amendments were provisions that altered the Programs to
include race-based preferencing schemes for both federal prime contractors' 5
and their subcontractors.
Part II of this Note will explore the constitutional obligations of racebased federal contracting programs. This inquiry will begin with an
examination of Fullilove v. Klutznick16 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.' 7 and will ultimately lead to the seminal case on the subject: Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.'8 The United States Supreme Court has held that
race-based preferencing in government contract procurement and acquisition
programs is not per se constitutionally defective.19 However, the Court has also
held that the standard of review to be applied when evaluating such programs,
whether federal, state, or local, is "strict scrutiny" because race-based
preferencing involves a classification based on race-a classification which has
been deemed "suspect." 2 0 To pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny,
race-based preferencing programs must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.21
Part III of this Note will begin with an overview of the federal contract
procurement and acquisition process and will then focus at length on Adarand
Constructors v. Pena22 and its subsequent judicial history. Adarand is perhaps
the most influential case regarding race-based federal contracting preferences.
Moreover, it provides a clear example of how Section 8(d) functions and how
race-based preferences violate constitutionally protected interests.
Part IV of this Note will examine the constitutionality of the Programs.
Within Part IV, the argument will be presented that in their current form, i.e.,
with the inclusion of race-based preferences based on a presumed social
disadvantage, the Programs cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Moreover, Part IV

Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757 (1978).
See U.S. SMALL Bus. Ass'N, SUBCONTRACTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 92 (2006), available
at
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Subcontracting%20Assistance%2OProgram.pdf
(defining a prime contractor as a "large or small business which has one or more contracts with
the Federal Government"); see also Prime Contractor, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/prime-contractor.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2012)
(defining a prime contractor as the "[c]hief contractor who has a contract with the owner of a
project or job ... and may employ (and manage) one or more subcontractors to carry out specific
parts of the contract").
16
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
14

15

17
18
19
20
21
22

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
See id. at 237.
See id. at 227.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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will argue that the Programs could be more narrowly tailored while still
achieving the same legislative goals by replacing the race-based preferences
with race-neutral alternatives. Finally, Part IV will also argue that the
requirement of an annual small disadvantaged business ("SDB") participation
goal is analogous to the racial quotas found unconstitutional in Gratz v.
Bollinger.2 3
Part V of this note will propose alterations to the Programs that would
bring them into congruence with the Constitution. The first proposal is to
implement an individualized need-based assessment as a threshold to eligibility
for the Programs. Furthermore, Part V will argue that the proper focus of the
SBA should be on implementing a need-based review process for determining
Program eligibility because need is wholly race-neutral. This Part will also
argue that the subcontractor compensation clause currently mandated for most
non-Section 8(a) prime contractors should be abandoned. In conclusion, Part V
will present the argument that if the Programs were repealed, a civil rights
action under either 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, depending on the
nature of the contractual relationship, would still provide sufficient and
meaningful protection to a minority-owned business that feels it was unfairly
discriminated against during the contract acquisition phase.
III. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

Equality in federal contracting became law in the twentieth century, but
in a larger sense, it is merely one point in the continuum of this nation's
advancement toward a just and fair society. Any thoughtful analysis of the
constitutional issues surrounding race-based federal preferencing programs
must be based upon a thorough understanding of the subject's history. That
history shows that the government's efforts to promote fairness and equality in
the realm of federal contracting-noble efforts to be sure-have been expanded
beyond what is constitutionally permissible.
A.

Early Anti-DiscriminationPolicies:Roosevelt to Johnson

In the mid-twentieth century, the legislative and executive branches of
the United States government recognized that the budgetary power of the
federal government could be used as a tool to aid in eliminating racial
discrimination. The roots of the federal government's anti-discrimination
contracting policies date back at least to the administration of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, during which the first executive orders prohibiting
discrimination in federal contract procurement were issued.24

23
24

539 U.S. 244, 275-76 (2003).
Exec. Order No. 8,802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3,109 (June 25, 1941).
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Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941, which began
by stating that the Order's purpose was to "encourage full participation in the
national defense program by all citizens . . . regardlessof race, creed, color, or
nationalorigin" because the only way the country could be defended was "with
the help and support of all groups within its borders."2 5 Accordingly, Roosevelt
ordered that "[a]ll contracting agencies of the Government of the United States
shall include in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated by them a provision
obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of
race, creed, color, or national origin." 26 However, the Order was issued because
of the compelling governmental interest in preparing the nation for war with
Germany and Japan, not for the altruistic reasons of later legislation. Notably,
the Order merely prohibited contemporaneous and future discrimination; it did
not have an eye towards any past societal, individual, or industry-specific
discrimination, all three of which became future justifications for race-based
legislation.
The origins of the federal government's modern relationship with small
businesses can also be traced to the Roosevelt era. In June 1942, Congress
passed the Small Business Mobilization Act to aid national defense through
increased production of war materiel.27 Congress recognized that small
businesses might not have the ability to produce war materiel at the same price
as larger firms; therefore, it was in the nation's interest to pay a higher price to
"mobilize the productive facilities of small business in the interests of
successful prosecution of the war." 28 Accordingly, the Smaller War Plants
Corporation, a subsidiary of the War Plants Corporation, was created pursuant
to the Small Business Mobilization Act and was granted authority to directly
subcontract with small businesses of five hundred or fewer employees for
production of war materiel.29
Perhaps the greatest advancements toward a society free of
discrimination were made during the administration of Lyndon Johnson.
During his presidency, Johnson constantly pushed for enhanced civil rights
protections, the most significant of which lay in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Among the sweeping changes contained therein, Title VII made it unlawful "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual .. . because of such individual's race, color, religion,

Id. at 3,109 (emphasis added).
26
Id. (emphasis added).
27
Small Business Mobilization Act, Pub. L. No. 77-603, 56 Stat. 351 (1942) (50 App. U.S.C.
§§ 1101-09, 1111 (omitted), § 1110 (transferred 12 U.S.C. § 265), § 1112 (repealed by 61 Stat.
25

449 (1947)).
28
Id. at 351.
29
Id. at 354.
30

Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1965) (codified as amended at Chapter 21 of 42 U.S.C.).
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sex, or national origin." 31 Furthermore, similar to Executive Order 8802 that
Roosevelt had issued in 1941, Johnson issued the "Equal Employment
Opportunity" Order on September 24, 1965.32 This Order established several
policies of the federal government, including a prohibition on discrimination in
governmental employment, a prohibition on discrimination in employment by
government contractors and subcontractors, and nondiscrimination provisions
in federally-assisted construction contracts.33
Establishmentof the Small Business Administrationand the 1978
Amendments

B.

The SBA was created on July 30, 1953, when President Eisenhower
signed the Act.34 The SBA's original stated purpose was to "aid, counsel, assist,
and protect insofar as possible the interests of small business concerns."3 In
1958 the SBA was established as a permanent federal agency under executive
control.36
Much of the SBA's pre-1978 legislation signaled the federal
government's desire to affect a prospective prohibition on discrimination in
federal contract procurement. However, due to perceived weaknesses in the
Act's effectiveness at including SDBs, Congress charted a new course in 1978
when it approved several amendments, thereby creating the Programs.
Pursuant to the 1978 amendments, the Act38 now says that "[i]t is the
policy of the United States that small business concerns . . . owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, . . . shall

have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of
contracts let by any Federal agency." 39 The 1978 amendments also created a
requirement that the SBA extend financial, managerial, technical and other
services to certified SDBs. 4 0 Furthermore, the 1978 amendments produced a
presumption that most racial minorities are socially disadvantaged.4 1

3
32

33

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965).

Id.

34

Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, § 204, 67 Stat. 230, 233-34.

3

Id.

36
Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-57q
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
3
Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 637(a), (d)
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
3
15 U.S.C. §§ 631-57q.

40

Id. § 637(d)(1).
Id. § 637(b)(1)(A)(i).

41

Id. § 637(d)(3)(C).

3
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Currently, the Act defines a "socially disadvantaged individual" as one
"who [has] been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because
of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual
qualities." 2 The Act also defines "economically disadvantaged individuals" as
"[a] socially disadvantaged individual[] whose ability to compete in the free
enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit
opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not
socially disadvantaged."'
In order to achieve the goal of increasing SDB participation in federal
contracting, the 1978 amendments further mandated that the following
language be included in nearly all federal contracts: "The contractor hereby
agrees to carry out [the] policy [of increasing SDB participation] in the
awarding of contracts to the fullest extent consistent with the efficient
performance of this contract."44 To implement the aforementioned statutory
commands, the SBA has employed two mechanisms: the Section 8(a) and
Section 8(d) programs.
1.

Section 8(a)

The purpose of Section 8(a) is to "assist eligible [SDBs] compete in the
American economy."45 Additionally, it provides businesses participating in the
program with a plethora of benefits, such as eligibility to bid on sole-source46
and "set aside"47 contracts, and help from the SBA in general business
procurement and managerial guidance. Section 8(a) essentially allows the
government, after relevant contract procurement procedures have been
completed,48 to choose a more expensive alternative to an equivalent product or
service merely because the more expensive alternative has been certified as a
SDB.

42

43
4

Id. § 637(a)(5).
Id. § 637(a)(6)(A).
Id. § 637(d)(3)(B).

13 C.F.R § 124.1 (2012).
"Sole source acquisition means a contract for the purchase of supplies or services that is
entered into or proposed to be entered into by an agency after soliciting and negotiating with only
one source." See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2011).
47
"Set-asides are contract dollars allocated to specific would-be suppliers, including small
businesses owned by minorities .... The Small Business Administration (SBA) sets annualprocurement preference goals for the federal government to follow." Jill R. Aitoro, Federal
Government to Award $20 Billion in Set-Aside Contracts, CRN.coM (Feb. 15, 2006, 4:50 PM),
http://www.cm.com/news/channel-programs/1 80202489/federal-government-to-award-20billion-in-set-aside-contracts.htm~jsessionid=ZGJXWFsoKEoymru+PhEJMw**.ecappj02.
48
See infra Part III.D.
45

46
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To be eligible for Section 8(a) certification, the applicant-business must
meet several threshold requirements: it must be capable of being classified as a
"small" business, 49 it must "demonstrate[] potential for success,"5 0 and it must
be "owned and controlled by a socially and economically disadvantaged
individual." 5' Regarding ownership, the SBA's regulations require that at least
51% of the business be owned by individuals who qualify as both "socially"5 2
and "economically"5 3 disadvantaged.
Under the Act, there exists a presumption that certain racial
minorities are socially disadvantaged. 5 The SBA's regulations offer the
following guidance for determining whether an individual is "socially
disadvantaged":
There is a rebuttable presumption that the following
individuals are socially disadvantaged: Black Americans;
Hispanic Americans; Native Americans (Alaska Natives,
Native Hawaiians, or enrolled members of a Federally or State
recognized Indian Tribe); Asian Pacific Americans. . . ; and

members of other groups designated from time to time by
s
SBA ....
Firms that wish to participate in the 8(a) program but are not owned
and controlled by members of one of the aforementioned groups must establish
by a "preponderance of the evidence" that they meet several requirements to be
certified as a SDB. 57 First, the applicant-owner must show that they are socially
disadvantaged, which can be done by either presenting specific evidence or
through the above-mentioned statutory presumption.58 Once the social
disadvantage requirement is met, the applicant-owner then must show an actual
economic disadvantage. 59
An "economically disadvantaged" individual is defined as one who is
socially disadvantaged and "whose ability to compete in the free enterprise
system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as
compared to others in the same business area who are not socially

5o
51
52
5

54
5
56

5
5
5

13 C.F.R. § 124.102.
Id. § 124.101.
15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4)(A)(i)(1) (2006); see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.101.
13 C.F.R. § 124.103; see also 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5).
13 C.F.R. §124.104; see also 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A).
See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing the presumption of social disadvantage).
13 C.F.R. § 124.103.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
§ 124.103(c)(1).

Id.
Id
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disadvantaged."60 Each individual claiming economic disadvantage must
describe it in a narrative statement and must also submit personal financial
information.6 ' The factors analyzed by the SBA to determine economic
disadvantage include "income for the past three years . . . , personal net worth,
and [total asset value]."6 2 To be eligible for SDB certification, the individual
claiming economic disadvantage must have a net worth less than $250,000
prior to application, and less than $750,000 for continued eligibility.63
Additionally, the individual's adjusted gross income for the three years prior to
application must be lower than $250,000 per annum64 and no greater than
$350,000 per annum 65 for continued eligibility.
2.

Section 8(d)

Section 8(d) program is similar to Section 8(a) in that they both are
designed to increase SDB participation in federal contracting; however, Section
8(d) is notably different in several critical aspects. Section 8(a) allows federal
agencies to award contracts directly to businesses that have received SBA
certification as "socially and economically disadvantaged," 66 whereas Section
8(d) applies to eligibility for subcontractors hired by federal prime contractors
if the prime contractor is not a certified Section 8(a) firm.67 Section 8(d) also
includes an expanded list of potentially eligible participants: businesses owned
by women, businesses owned by veterans, and HUBZone6 8 businesses.
Under Section 8(d), when a federal contract over a certain value is
awarded to a non-Section 8(a) prime contractor, 69 the prime contractor must
submit a subcontracting plan. 70 The subcontracting plan must include a goal for

60
61
62

63

15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A) (2006).
13 C.F.R. § 124.104(b)(1).

Id. § 124.104(c).
Id. § 124.104(c)(2).

6
Id § 124.104(c)(3)(i). Income is averaged for the three years prior to application and must
not exceed an average of $350,000 for a three year period after certification is obtained. Id.
65
Id.
66
67
68

15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(B) (2006).
See 48 C.F.R. § 19.702(a) (2011). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 632(p)(1) (2006). HUBZone is the acronym for a historically underutilized

business zone which is "any area located within I or more- (A) qualified census tracts; (B)
qualified nonmetropolitan counties; (C) lands within the external boundaries of an Indian
reservation; (D) redesignated areas; or (E) base closure areas," all of which are determined by the
SBA. Id.
69
48 C.F.R. § 19.702(a)(1). The current value for qualifying federal awards must exceed
$650,000 or $1,5000,000 if the contract is for construction. Id
70
48 C.F.R. § 19.702. The subcontracting plan currently required contains eleven separate
elements. For the statutory text of the subcontracting plan, see 48 C.F.R. § 52.219-9 (2011).
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how much of the prime contract will be subcontracted to Section 8(d)qualifying businesses, both as a percentage and a total dollar amount.n
Additionally, the subcontracting plan includes a subcontractor compensation
clause that creates "incentives" for prime contractors to accept bids from and
hire certified SDBs instead of from their non-SDB counterparts: reasonable
minds may differ on whether this constitutes "compensation" or is more
appropriately characterized as a "bonus." That difference in interpretation,
discussed in Part IV of this Note, has been a source of contention in a litany of
litigation, most notably in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena,72
To recap, certified Section 8(a) firms are permitted to bid on federal
prime contracts. This means that the Section 8(a) firm contracts directly with
the federal agency awarding the contract. However, if a contract is awarded to a
non-Section 8(a) firm, that firm must include a subcontracting plan specifying
how much of the original contract award will be allocated to Section 8(d)
subcontractors.
At this point, one may wonder why an analysis of these programs is
important. Aside from the argument that the Programs are unconstitutional, the
amount of money spent on the Programs begs attention. Funding for the
Programs is staggering not only when measured by volume, but also when
measured by the percentage of funding directed to Section 8(a) and Section
8(d) firms. For an example of the sheer volume of money allocated to Section
8(a) firms, in 2010 the Department of Defense spending goal on Section 8(a)
firms was upwards of $12,000,000,000, with another $8,000,000,000 directed
to Section 8(d) firms.73 Furthermore, some agencies are directed to spend
grossly disproportionate amounts on Section 8(a) and Section 8(d) firms. An
egregious example of disparate allocation is the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, which was directed to spend one hundred percent of its
2010 small business budget on Section 8(a) firms. 4 Although the total dollar
amount of these contracts-due to inflation-was certainly lower when the
Programs were created, it was still only a matter of time before the
constitutionality of race-based preferencing programs was challenged.

n'

See 48 C.F.R. § 19.704(a)-(b) (2011).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (AdarandlM), 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also discussion
infra Part IV.
7
FED. PROCUREMENT DATA SYS. - NEXT GENERATION, SMALL BusINEss GOALING REPORT
at
available
2010,
YEAR
FiscAL
(last
https://www.fpds.gov/downloads/top_requests/FPDSNGSB GoalingFY_201 0.pdf
accessed Nov. 6, 2012).
74
Id
72
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The FirstChallenges: Fullilove and Croson

The first major challenge to the constitutionality of race-based
preferencing programs came in 1980. In Fullilove v. Klutznick," the petitioners
argued that a race-based preferencing scheme earlier enacted by Congress
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The petitioner's specific challenge in Fullilove was that some of
the amendments to the Local Public Works Capital Development and
Investment Act of 1976 were facially unconstitutional."
The amendments, created by the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, generated the "minority business enterprise" ("MBE") provision79
which said:
[N]o grant shall be made under this Act for any local public
works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory
assurance . .. that at least 10 per centum of the amount of each

grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For
purposes of this paragraph, the term "minority business
enterprise" means a business at least 50 per centum of which is
owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly
owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is
owned by . .. citizens of the United States who are Negroes,

Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.80

Under the MBE provision, a contract could be awarded to an MBE that
had submitted an unreasonably high bid "if their bids reflect[ed] merely
attempts to cover costs inflated by the present effects of prior disadvantage and
discrimination." 8 ' Additionally, the MBE provision required that, absent an
administrative waiver, at least ten percent of federal funds granted for local
public works projects must be used by the grantee to procure services from
MBEs. The implementing regulations required the grantee "to seek out ...
[MBEs], to provide technical assistance as needed, to lower or waive bonding
requirements where feasible, to solicit the aid of the Office of Minority

7s
76

448 U.S. 448 (1980), abrogatedin part byAdarandIII, 515 U.S. 200.
Pub. L. No. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-10 (2006)).

n

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453.
Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

78

§§ 6701-10 (2006)).
It is worth noting that the MBE provision at issue in Fullilove did not require a showing of
actual economic disadvantage, which would later be required under Section 8(a) and Section
8(d).
80
Pub. L. No. 95-28, § 103, 91 Stat. 116, 117.
81
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 448.
7

82

Id.
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Business Enterprise [and] the Small Business Administration... , and to give
guidance through the intricacies of the bidding process."83
Fullilove was an important case for several reasons. Not only was it a
direct challenge to Congressional action, but the fragmented opinion 84 failed to
resolve a major question: under which standard of review are challenges to
race-based preferencing to be scrutinized? The opinion of the Court, delivered
by Chief Justice Burger, upheld the MBE provision but failed to adopt a
specific standard of review and instead employed a two-part test.85 The Court
first found that the objectives of the Local Public Works Capital Development
and Investment Act of 1976 were within Congress's authority under the
Spending Power 8 6 and the Commerce Clause.87 The Court then found that
Congress's use of racial and ethnic criteria was a constitutionally valid means
to accomplish its objectives." In so holding, the Court reiterated its previous
position that in the MBE's remedial context, there is no requirement that
Congress act in a wholly "color-blind" fashion.89
Justice Powell wrote a separate concurrence to express his view that
although the plurality had failed to specify the standard of review under which
the program was reviewed, the plurality had in fact applied "strict scrutiny." 90
Powell elucidated that even though the Court had perhaps unknowingly applied
strict scrutiny, the program was still valid.9' Powell explained that the Court
had correctly determined that the ten percent set-aside was "a necessary means
of advancing a compelling governmental interest," 9 2 and thus passed
constitutional muster under strict scrutiny.9 3
Justice Marshall filed an extensive concurrence in which intermediate
scrutiny was advocated when analyzing the constitutionality of racial
classifications that were made for the benefit of minorities by remedying the
present effects of past discrimination. 9 4 Marshall believed that the
classifications made in the MBE provision must "serve important governmental

83

Id.

84

Five separate opinions were filed, with two pluralities.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473.

85

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have power to... provide for the...
general welfare of the United States . . .
87
Id. at art. I, §8, cl. 3.
88
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 450.
89
See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
90
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 507 (Powell, J., concurring).
91
92

Id.

9

Id. at 507.
Id. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., concurring).

94

Id at 496.
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objectives and [be] substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
Because Marshall found the governmental interest to be important and the
MBE provision to be substantially related to that interest, he therefore held that
it survived intermediate scrutiny.96
In dissent, Justice Stewart argued that the Constitution required the
federal government to meet the same standard as that required of the States
when enacting race-based legislation. 97 Stewart believed the issue of race-based
legislation had been identified and correctly resolved by Justice Harlan when
the latter said "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. ... The law regards man as man, and takes no account
of his surroundings or of his color....". Because Stewart believed all racebased classifications were unconstitutional, he found the statute at issue to be
invalid. 99
Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing that "[r]acial classifications are
simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between
justification and classification."' 0 0 Essentially, Stevens believed that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard and that because the classification at
issue was not narrowly tailored, it therefore failed strict scrutiny.' 0
In the absence of a unified opinion regarding the correct standard under
which race-based legislation was to be reviewed, Fullilove set little
precedential value for future challenges to similar statutes. A similar issue
would again receive attention from the Court a decade later in City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,1 02 in which the Court struck down a state law that
required prime contractors "to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of
each contract to one or more [MBEs]."o 3
In Croson, the Court held that "the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited
by a particular classification" and that the appropriate standard of review for all
racial classifications was "strict scrutiny."' 04 However, because of the absence
of federal action, Croson did not resolve the lingering uncertainty regarding the
correct standard of review for federal race-based legislation.

at 519.

SId.
96

Id

9

See id. at 522-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 522-23 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).

98

99

Id at 527.

1oo Id at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101

See id. at 541.

102

488 U.S. 469 (1989).

103

Id. at 469.

'

Id at 494.
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A Unified Standard:Adarand and Strict Scrutiny

D.

A summary of the basic federal procurement process is beneficial
05
a case in
before an examination of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,1
guardrail
for
subcontract
8(d)
a
Section
from
arose
suit
of
which the basis
process
procurement
federal
the
installation awarded to a SDB. Currently,
begins when acquisition personnel, after determining a federal agency's needs,
06
posts a solicitation for bids on the Federal Business Opportunities website.
Prime contractors interested in obtaining the contract then prepare and submit
their bids. After the submission period is closed, the acquisition personnel of
the agency evaluate the prime contractors' offers in accordance with the
Federal Acquisition Regulations.' 07 If the prime contract is awarded to a
certified SDB under Section 8(a), no subcontracting plan' 08 is required.
However, if the prime contract is not awarded to a certified SDB, a
subcontracting plan must be submitted to comply with Section 8(d).
1.

Background

The basis for the petitioner's suit in Adarand began in 1989 when the
United States Department of Transportation awarded a highway construction
contract to Mountain Gravel and Construction Company. 109 As the prime
contractor, Mountain Gravel solicited bids from subcontractors for the guardrail
portion of the project.o Among the submissions were bids from both Adarand
Constructors (the lowest bid) and Gonzales Construction."I However,
Mountain Gravel's contract from the federal government included the
subcontractor compensation clause which provided additional compensation if
it hired SDBs;"l 2 Gonzales Construction was certified as a SDB, but Adarand
Constructors was not.' 13 As a direct result of this contractual language,
Mountain Gravel awarded the contract to Gonzales Construction.114

105

AdarandIII,515 U.S. 200 (1995).

106

FEDERAL BUSINEss

OPPORTUNITIES, https://www.fedbizopps.gov

(last visited Nov. 6,

2012).
107
The Federal Acquisition Regulations System is codified at Title 48 of the Code of Federal
Regulation.
See 48 C.F.R. § 19.704(a)-(b) (2011).
1os
AdarandIII, 515 U.S. at 205.
1o9

110

See id.

"'

Id.

112

id
Id.
114
See id. Mountain Gravel's Chief Estimator submitted an affidavit stating that but for the
additional compensation provided by the contract, Adarand would have been selected as the
subcontractor.
113
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Adarand challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(d) under the Fifth
Amendment's proscription against the federal government's denial of equal
protection of the law, specifically citing the race-based presumptions involved
in the use of subcontractor compensation clauses.' 15 Adarand's argument was
rejected by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado when
the government's motion for summary judgment was granted.' 16
Adarand then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
where the District Court's judgment was affirmed in Adarand II.117 The Tenth
Circuit based its holding on the "intermediate scrutiny" standard that was set
forth in Fullilove nearly fifteen years earlier.' 18 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
the federal government, acting under authority of Congress and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment," 9 can legislate affirmative action programs more
freely than state or local governments. 120 After the Tenth Circuit's affirmation
of the District Court's ruling, Adarand petitioned the Supreme Court for

certiorari.121
The Supreme Court granted Adarand's petition in order to resolve the
issue of which is the appropriate standard for review for federal race-based
action: intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny.12 2 The respondents in Adarand
III argued that "[t]he Subcontracting Compensation Clause program is. .. a
program based on disadvantage, not on race," and thus is subject only to "the
most relaxed judicial scrutiny."l 23 However, the respondents conceded that "the
race-based rebuttable presumption" used in determining certification as a SDB
was subject to a heightened level of scrutiny.12 4 The Court, in an effort to
correctly identify the scope of its decision, clarified that the race-based statute
at issue in AdarandIII was unlike others it had reviewed, which had been either

Id. at 210.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner (AdarandI), 790 F. Supp. 240, 245 (D. Colo. 1992),
vacated, Adarand III, 515 U.S. 200.
1"
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand II), 16 F.3d 1537, 1539 (10th Cir. 1994),
vacated,Adarand III, 515 U.S. 200.
118 See id at 1544. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), abrogatedin part by
Adarandfll, 515 U.S. 200; discussion supraPart IIl.C.
119 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
120 AdarandI, 16 F.3d at 1545.
121
See Adarand III, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
115
116

122

Id

Id. at 212-13 (citing Brief for the Respondents at 26, AdarandIII, 515 U.S. 200 (No. 931841), 1994 WL 694992 at 26).
124 See id. at 213.
123
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facially race-neutral but resulted in a racially disproportionate impactl25 or had
been motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.126
The Court began by determining the proper basis for Adarand's claims,
specifically taking note that the Fifth Amendment protects citizens from
"arbitrarytreatment by the Federal Government, [which] is not as explicit a
guarantee of equal treatment as the Fourteenth Amendment."1 2 7 The Court
discussed at length the jurisprudential history which led to its conclusion that
"[t]his Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims [is]
precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment."l 28
The Court bluntly set forth its holding after its long discussion
reconciling previous Fifth Amendment1 29 and Fourteenth Amendment 30
jurisprudence, which culminated in finding that the equal protection
components of each are indistinguishable. 13 In overruling any residual
authority that Fullilove might have had on federal race-based classifications,
the Court announced that strict scrutiny was the proper standard under which
such laws should be reviewed by holding "[f]ederal racial classifications, like
those of the State, must serve a compelling overnmental interest, and must be
narrowly tailored to further that interest." 2 In announcing its decision, the
majority agreed with Justice Stevens's dissent in Fullilove that "[b]ecause
racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment,
and because classifications based on race are potentially so harmful to the
entire body politic, it is especially important that the reasons for any such
classification be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate," and that
"[r]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most
exact connection between justification and classification."' 33
Unfortunately, the Court did not take the opportunity before it to make
a ruling on the merits; it merely announced the new standard of review. After
announcing its decision, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts

125
126

See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

AdarandIII,515 U.S. at 213.
Id. at 217 (citing Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)).
129
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.").
130
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall .. . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
131
AdarandIII,515 U.S. at 213-17.
132
Id at 235. Along with abrogating Fullilove in part, this decision also overruled Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which held that intermediate scrutiny was the
appropriate standard of review for federal legislation with benign racial classifications. Id.
133
Id. at 236 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), abrogatedin partby AdarandIII,515 U.S. 200).
127
128
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because the lower courts had reviewed the statute at issue under intermediate
scrutiny, and although the governmental interest was previously found
"significant," it now needed to be determined if the governmental interest was
"compelling."1 34 Furthermore, the lower courts also had failed to address
whether the statute was narrowly tailored with respect to the newly announced
strict scrutiny standard.13 5 Finally, the Court noted a discrepancy between the
requirements of the definition of "economically disadvantaged" in the

Programs. 13 6
2.

On Remand: Different Standard, Different Result

Much like the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit also passed on the
opportunity to decide the merits of the case and sent the case back to the
District Court.13 7 The District Court, in an opinion issued by Senior District
Judge John Kane, granted Adarand's motion for summary judgment and issued
an injunction enjoining the defendants from "soliciting bids for, or allocating
any funds under the [challenged] program."' 3 8 To clarify his ruling, Judge Kane
added that this decision "precludes the implementation of the statutes or
regulations that grant presumptive eligibility for government preference in
contracting on the basis of race, i.e., the use of presumptions of social and
economic disadvantage in Section 8(d) of the Small Business Act." 39 Judge
Kane believed that although the laws at issue served a compelling
governmental interest, they were not narrowly tailored.14 0

134

See id. at 237.

'35

Id.
Id. at 238. Previous regulations for Section 8(a) participants required a showing that such
person's ability to compete has been impaired "as compared to others in the same or similar line
of business who are not socially disadvantaged," while Section 8(d) regulations require a
showing merely "as compared to others in the same or similar line of business." Id.
13
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand IV), 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1558 (D. Colo.
1997), rev'dsub nom., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000). The
District Court candidly expressed its displeasure with both the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit prior to its statement of jurisdiction:
[C]oncerns of judicial efficiency and the desire to resolve disputes quickly
would have favored the resolution of the remaining legal issues by the higher
courts. Following the remand, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals entered an
order stating that, its own judgment having been vacated and, upon
consideration of the Supreme Court's judgment, the cause was remanded to
this court for further proceedings. Again, in light of the lack of a genuine
issue as to any material fact, the rationale for the circuit court's remand to
this trial court eludes me.
Id.
138
Id.
136

"

Id. (emphasis added).

"

See id at 1570.
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Regarding the existence of a "compelling governmental interest,"
Judge Kane believed that the only interest that ustifies racial classifications
were those which sought to remedy past wrongs. 1 Regarding federal contract
awards, Adarand argued that there was no evidence of any racial discrimination
in Colorado, and there were only two isolated incidents nationwide prior to
Congress's adoption of the Programs. 142 To the contrary, the defendants argued

that the scope of the Programs was within Congress's legislative powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 3
Judge Kane went on to distinguish the challenged legislation in
Adarand III with the legislation that was at issue in Oregon v. Mitchell.44 In
Mitchell, the challenged legislation was a literacy test that was essentially being
used to deny African-Americans the right to vote.14 5 Judge Kane believed this
was significantly different that the alleged harm in Adarand III because
"[e]nforcing the right to vote of a member of a minority group does not require,
ipso facto, the denial of that right to anyone else."l 46 Unlike equal access to
voting, the corollary of awarding a contract to one firm is that that contract is
necessarily denied to a different firm. Judge Kane ultimately found that under
both Adarand III and Croson, Congress was not prohibited from remedying the
effects of past discrimination if it could be shown that the federal government
was a "passive participant [by providing funding] in a system of racial
exclusion," and that no individualized showing of racial discrimination was

necessary. 14 7
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY

This Part will show, through the use of Supreme Court precedent and
the text of the United States Constitution, that the Programs permit both the
deprivation of equal protection of the laws to some citizens and also fail strict
scrutiny, and that the Programs are therefore unconstitutional. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which has been applied to the federal government through the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, provides that "no [government]
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

141
Id. (relying on City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion)).

142

See id.

143

See id at 1571.

"

400 U.S. 112 (1970).

14s

Id. at 112.

146

AdarandIV, 965 F. Supp. at 1573.

147

id.
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laws."1 4 8 With the 1978 amendments to the Act, the Constitution was derailed
from its mandate of equality and was permutated into something that now
allows constructive discrimination based solely on race.14 9
In Fullilove, the Supreme Court said "[i]t is not a constitutional defect
in this Frogram that it may disappoint the expectations of some [non-SDB]
firms."' However, "failed expectations" is not the constitutional defect in the
Programs; rather, the constitutional defect is that those firms denied access to
federal contracts have been subjected to an unequal application of the law as a
direct result of the race of the firm's principal. This failure to treat citizens
equally merely on the basis of race is repugnant to the core purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A.

Compelling Interest

Under strict scrutiny, a compelling governmental interest is the
threshold over which a race-based law must pass to be constitutionally valid;
without a compelling interest, analysis of whether the law is narrowly tailored
is moot. The Court requires a compelling interest "because racial characteristics
so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment, and because
classifications based on race are potentially so harmful to the entire body
politic."' 5' When remedial legislation-such as the Programs-is challenged,
the party defending the legislation "bears the initial burden of production to
show the program is supported by a strong basis in evidence."l 5 2 In addition to
the defending party's showing, courts must conduct a "searching judicial
inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures." 53
In Adarand IV, Judge Kane began his compelling-interest analysis by
first recognizing that "[t]here appears to be only one compelling interest
recognized by the Supreme Court to justify racial classifications, namely
remedying past wrongs." 54 Because the underlying purpose of Section 8(d)
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This has been read to apply to the federal government
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
149
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2000, white non-Hispanic males (the primary
group of citizens categorically denied eligibility for Section 8(a) and Section 8(d)) comprised
roughly 34.8% of the total population. Resident PopulationEstimates of the United States by Sex,
Race, and Hispanic Origin: April 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999, with Short-Term Projection to
November
1,
2000,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Jan.
2,
2001),
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/intfile3-1.txt.
148

Iso
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980), abrogatedin part by Adarand III, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
151 See id. at 533-35.
152
AdarandIV, 965 F. Supp. at 1577 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
277 (1986)).
153
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
154
AdarandIV,965 F. Supp. at 1570 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
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was to remedy past wrongs, Judge Kane then conducted a searching judicial
inquiry into the program's justifications, after which he concluded that
"Congress has a strong basis in evidence for enacting the challenged statutes,
which thus serve a 'compelling governmental interest."' 155 The "strong basis in
evidence" was the record of congressional hearings, the relevant legislative
history of the SBA, and the recorded statements by members of Congress; the
court found that these bases were sufficient to support a finding that racial
barriers in federal contract awards existed. 56
Although determining what constitutes a "compelling" interest is
subjective, the Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized that remedying the
effects of past discrimination is such a compelling interest. Therefore, any
viable challenge to the Programs hinges on the argument that they do not
survive the second prong of strict scrutiny because they are not narrowly
tailored.
B.

Narrowly Tailored

Under the strict scrutiny test, any law that makes a race-based
classification must be "narrowly tailored" to serve a governmental interest
recognized as "compelling." The Supreme Court has named five factors that are
useful in a court's determination of whether a race-based law is narrowly
tailored: "(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of
the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority group
members in the relevant population or workforce; (iv) the availability of waiver
provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v) the effect of the remedy
upon innocent third parties." 15 ' This section will review each factor in turn.
1.

Efficacy of Alternative Remedies

In Adarand III, the Supreme Court alluded to a consideration to be
made upon remand: "whether there was 'any consideration of the use of raceneutral means to increase minority business participation' in government
contracting."
On remand, the district court agreed with Congress' findings,
namely that the race-neutral programs in effect from the promulgation of the
Act in 1953 up to the 1978 amendments that created the Programs were
ineffective at achieving the goal of increasing participation by SDBs.15 9

"

Id. at 1577.

156

Id. at 1574-75.

157

United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 187 (1987).
AdarandIII,515 U.S. 200, 237-38 (1995) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 507).
AdarandIV, 965 F. Supp. at 1584.

15
19
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Planned Duration of the Remedy

Along with consideration of race-neutral alternatives, the Supreme
Court in Adarand III alluded to the consideration of "whether the [SBA's]
program was appropriately limited such that it 'will not last longer than the
discriminatory effect it is designed to eliminate."" 60 The defendants asserted
that the duration of the challenged legislation is limited because it is "regularly
reviewed to determine whether [it is] still needed." 16 ' They further asserted that
Congress reviews evidence "to determine whether the goals are achieving the
desired result of remedying discrimination and the lingering effects of past
discrimination nationwide and has determined there is a need to continue the
[SDB] requirements of § 644(g)."l6 2
3.

Relationship Between Included Minorities and the Target
Workforce

The Programs fail this factor because they are both overinclusive and
underinclusive. The Programs are overinclusive because they create a
presumption of social disadvantage for individuals that quite possibly have
never suffered from discrimination in the award of federal contracts. The
Programs are also underinclusive because they exclude "certain minority
groups whose members are economically and socially disadvantaged due to
past discrimination." 63
a.

Overinclusive

The Programs' standard of presumptive eligibility is far too likely to
include citizens that have themselves never suffered any discrimination in the
realm of federal contracting. Before Congress can include a particular racial
group in a race-based classification, it must "inquir[e] into whether or not the
particular [group] seeking a racial preference has suffered from the effects of
past discrimination. "'6 However, the current language of Section 8(a) would
permit a racial preference to be afforded to many groups that have not in fact
suffered from the effects of past discrimination.
For an illustration of the Programs' failings, let's imagine that Firm X
is bidding on a federal contract. Firm X is owned by a recently naturalized
United States citizen from Mongolia. Assuming the firm's principal can show
160
AdarandIII, 515 U.S. at 237-38 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980),
abrogatedin part by Adarand III, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)).
161
AdarandIV,965 F. Supp. at 1583.
162
id. at 1584.
163
Id. at 1580.
1s

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989).
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economic disadvantage, the current language of Section 8(a) would allow the
Mongolian presumptive eligibility even though there is little likelihood that the
federal government has discriminated against Mongolian firms in the past. To
remedy this overinclusiveness, eligibility for the Programs should be altered
from a presumption of disadvantage to a need-based assessment.' 65
b.

Underinclusive

It is important to recognize that, in the history of our nation, although
racial discrimination is perhaps the most perceptible form of discrimination to
the average citizen, it is certainly not the only discrimination that has
economically and socially disadvantaged a particular group. Additionally,
within the broad strokes of any racial classification there are innumerable
ethnic, religious and other subcategories within the "majority" that have also
suffered from discrimination.166
For an illustration, one need not leave the bounds of the twentieth
century or the Supreme Court's membership: Justice Hugo Black was
notoriously anti-Catholic.16 7 In a speech made while running for the United
States Senate and in response to an enormous surge in Italian immigration in
the early 1920s, Black decried the Catholic influx and proclaimed that "[o]nly
desirable immigrants should ever again be admitted."' 6 Black's statement was
one aim of which was to
made regarding the Immigration Act of 1924,
virtually eliminate Italian immigration.
Non-racial discrimination is hardly limited to anti-Catholicism. Among
the ethnic but non-racial minorities that have suffered severe and, in some
instances, continuing discrimination are Jews,o7 0 Italians,' 7 ' and Irish.172 By

165

See discussion infra Part V.
See infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
167
Although he would later say he regretted his membership, Justice Black went so far as to
become a member of Ku Klux Klan, joining in 1923. Ku Klux Klan-Hugo L. Black and the
KKK, L. LIBR.-AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., http://law.jrank.org/pages/8014/Ku-Klux-Klan-Hugo-LBlack-KKK.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
168
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 108 (2d ed. 1997). See also Letter from
Hugo Black to Mary C. Pittman, January 18, 1926, in which Black stated that "I am accused by
the opposition as being a candidate of the Ku Klux Klan. This will further show that I am not
amenable to Catholic influences."
Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (revised by the Immigration and Nationality Act of
169
1952 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
170
See ADL Survey: Anti-Semitism Declines Slightly in America; 14 Percent of Americans
4,
2005),
Hold
'Strong'
Anti-Semitic
Beliefs,
ADL
(Apr.
http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASUS_12/4680_12.htm.
'71
See ALAN G. GAUTHREAUX, AN EXTREME PREJUDICE: ANTI-ITALIAN SENTIMENT AND
VIOLENCE IN LOUISIANA, 1855-1924 (History4All 2011).
166
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aggregating all Caucasian ethnicities into the overbroad racial classification of
"white," the "preferential treatment for non-whites amount[s] to invidious
discrimination against other 'minorities'-that is, the discrete national origin
groups into which whites [have] been disaggregated."'"
Furthermore, the Programs provide no assistance for other various nonracial and non-ethnic groups that have suffered discrimination, such as
homosexuals, the elderly, or the mentally or physically handicapped.,74 These
groups are limited to retrospective relief under other legislation, such as the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,175 the Americans with Disabilities
Act,17 6 and Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.1n
It is likely that most Americans have some history of past
discrimination in their ancestry. Any determination of whether that past
discrimination is sufficient to justify statutory inclusion is arbitrary and wholly
subjective. Similar to my proposal to remedy the Programs'
overinclusiveness,' 7 8 to remedy the defect of underinclusiveness I would again
advocate an individualized need-based assessment.
4.

Availability of Waiver Provisions

Because the SBA allows for the possibility of a waiver from
participation, this factor outwardly supports a finding that the Programs are
narrowly tailored. However, upon closer review, a waiver seems exceedingly
difficult to obtain:
Grantees are given the opportunity to demonstrate that their
best efforts will not succeed or have not succeeded in
achieving the statutory 10% target for minority firm
participation within the limitations of the program's remedial

172

See RYAN

HACKNEY & AMY HACKNEY BLACKWELL, 101 THINGS You DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT

153-61
(2007).
173 Ian F. Haney Lopez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REv. 985, 990 (2007).
174
The SBA does have a program for service-disabled veterans. See Veterans Benefit Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 180-183, 117 Stat. 2651 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. and 38 U.S.C.).
175 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(2006)). Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, if a citizen believes they were
discriminated against because of their age, they are limited to declaratory and injunctive relief.
See also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
176 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
177 Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
17 See supra Part III.B.
IRISH HISTORY, THE PEOPLE, PLACES, CULTURE, AND TRADITIONS OF THE EMERALD ISLE

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss2/11

24

Bogard: Presumed Disadvantaged: Constitutional Incongruit in Federal Cont
PRESUMED DISADVANTAGED

2012]

871

objectives. In these circumstances a waiver or partial waiver is
available once compliance has been demonstrated. A waiver
may be sought and granted at any time during the contracting
process, or even prior to letting contracts if the facts warrant. 7
Essentially, to have the SBA's SDB-participation goal waived, the
prime contractor must show a complete and good-faith effort to seek out and
contract with SDBs. The corollary of this is that only if the price is
unreasonable and is not the result of the present effects of past discrimination,
or if there is a total absence of certified SDBs, is a waiver appropriate.
The difficulty in satisfying the "reasonableness of the price" element
lies with highly subjective nature of a determination of the effect the past
discrimination has on the bid submitted by the subcontractor. How can this be
realistically quantified and reduced to a reliable monetary amount? What is left
is essentially the absence of a true waiver.
5.

Effect upon Innocent Third Parties

The Supreme Court has said that "[w]hen effectuating a limited and
properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a
'sharing the burden' by innocent third parties is not impermissible."so This
factor has been chronically and severely mischaracterized by reviewing courts.
While it is true that non-SDBs theoretically "share" the burden, the proper
focus is on the individual firms affected when an SDB is hired under the
auspices of the Programs. "The actual 'burden' shouldered by [non-SDBs] is
relatively 1ight in this connection when we consider the scope of [total contract
awards]."
However, it is crucial to recognize that in order for the burden to be
shouldered by non-SDBs affected by race-based classifications, the
classifications generally must first be found to survive the other elements of
strict scrutiny. In other words, if the law serves a compelling interest but is not
narrowly tailored, then the burden imposed on the non-SDB is impermissible
and unconstitutional.
The Use of "Goals ": FederallyMandatedRacialBalancingAfter

C.

Gratz
In addition to the constitutional defects discussed above, the Programs
are also violative of the Supreme Court's prohibition on racial balancing
through the use of a quota system. In Croson, the Supreme Court struck down a

17
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 488 (1980), abrogatedin part by Adarand III, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).

"s

Id. at 484.

181

Id.
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law that required that at least thirty percent of the city's construction contracts
be awarded to MBEs.182 The majority held that "the 30% quota cannot be said
to be tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright racial balancing. It rests upon
the 'completely unrealistic' assumption that minorities will choose a particular
trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population."' 83
Although Croson produced only fractured pluralities, that Court's rejection of
an outright quota system was solidified in the Court's 2003 decision in Gratz v.
Bollinger.184 In Gratz, the Court held-similarly to its earlier decision in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke-'18 that racial quotas are
unconstitutional. The race-based numerical requirements rejected by the Court
in Bakke and Gratz are analogous to the numerical quota prescribed by the Act.
Under the Act, the President is required annually to establish the
federal goals for participation by MBEs procurement contracts, with total
awards being not higher than twenty-three percent and not lower than five
percent.' 86 With this in mind, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine how
one could view the SBA's regulations as anything short of a race-based quota
system, the sort of which has clearly been rejected by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional. 8 7 This view was shared by Judge Kane in Adarand IV." In
addition to his prohibition on the implementation of programs that allow race to
show a presumption of social disadvantage, Judge Kane also prohibited "the
use of percentage goals found in and promulgated pursuant to § 644(g) of the
SBA." 9
V. PROPOSED ALTERATIONS TO THE PROGRAMS

The presumption of social disadvantage based solely on race is
unconstitutional and should be amended.190 This section will provide two
suggestions that would bring the Programs into congruence with the
Constitution: basing social disadvantage on an individualized need-based
assessment and removal of the subcontractor compensation clause that operates

182

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).

184

539 U.S. 244 (2003).
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion). In Bakke, the University of California had
reserved sixteen percent of its admission slots for minority students. See id. at 265-67.
186 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (2006).
187 See generally Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
118 AdarandIV, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1558 (D. Colo. 1997), rev'd, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
18'

19

Id. at 1558.

190
At this point, I wish to make it clear that I am not opposed to the SBA's goal of assisting
SDBs participate in federal contract acquisition. However, as discussed supra Part III, I believe
that some of the current requirements for participation in the Programs are unconstitutional.
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as a bonus to firms that hire SDBs. Finally, if the Programs were stricken, the
possibility of suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a
sufficient disincentive for federal agencies and federal prime contractors to
eliminate discriminatory action while awarding contracts.
Abandoning Presumptionsfor an IndividualizedShowing ofNeed

A.

Strict scrutiny requires that a race-based preferencing program be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The SBAs
regulations that presume social disadvantage on the basis of race could easily
be more narrowly tailored by striking subsection (b) of 13 C.F.R. Section
124.103191 and instead using the test set forth in subsection (c) of that section as
the sole means for determining Program eligibility. Subsection (c)192 allows for
individuals who are not members of one of the groups designated as
presumptively disadvantaged by subsection (b) to still qualify for the program's
benefits if they establish social disadvantage by a preponderance of the
evidence.193

To sufficiently show social disadvantage under 13 C.F.R. Section
124(c), three elements must be satisfied. First, the individual must show "[a]t
least one objective distinguishing feature that has contributed to social
disadvantage, such as race, ethnic origin, gender, physical handicap, long-term
residence in an environment isolated from the mainstream of American society,
or other similar causes."l 94 Second, the individual must also show "[p]ersonal
experiences of substantial and chronic social disadvantage in American
society." 195 Finally, the individual must show that their disadvantage has had a
"[n]egative impact on entry into or advancement in the business world because
of the disadvantage." 96
In determining the final element, the "SBA will consider any relevant
evidence .... In every case, however, [the] SBA will consider education,
employment and business history, where applicable, to see if the totality of
circumstances shows disadvantage in entering into or advancing in the business
world."1 97 These considerations are codified as:
(A) Education. SBA considers such factors as denial of equal
access to institutions of higher education, exclusion from social
and professional association with students or teachers, denial

191

13 C.F.R. § 124.103 (2012).

192

Id. § 124.103(c).

194
1

Id.
Id. § 124.103(c)(2)(i).

195

Id. § 124.103(c)(2)(ii).

196

Id. §

197

id.

124.103(c)(2)(iii).
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of educational honors rightfully earned, and social patterns or
pressures which discouraged the individual from pursuing a
professional or business education. 98
(B) Employment. SBA considers such factors as unequal
treatment in hiring, promotions and other aspects of
professional advancement, pay and fringe benefits, and other
terms and conditions of employment; retaliatory or
discriminatory behavior by an employer; and social patterns or
pressures which have channelled [sic) the individual into
nonprofessional or non-business fields.' 9
(C) Business history. SBA considers such factors as unequal
access to credit or capital, acquisition of credit or capital under
commercially unfavorable circumstances, unequal treatment in
opportunities for government contracts or other work, unequal
treatment by potential customers and business associates, and
exclusion from business or professional organizations. 200
These considerations are the appropriate standard to determine true
disadvantage that will in turn lead to an appropriate allocation of the SBA's
resources. This level of individualized showing of need will remedy the
constitutional defects of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness by assuring
that those undeserving of assistance are excluded and that only those deserving
of assistance are included.
B.

Abandoning the SubcontractorCompensation Clause

The subcontractor compensation clause, which must be included in the
subcontracting plan of every non-Section 8(a) prime contractor, creates
"incentives" for those prime contractors to accept bids from and hire certified
SDBs instead of their non-SDB counterparts. Reasonable minds may differ on
whether this constitutes "compensation" or is more appropriately termed as a
"bonus." Those who would favor the former characterization would argue that
the contractual language merely compensates prime contractors for additional
expenses that are the result of their decision to hire an SDB. Those who would
favor the latter characterization would argue that the payment is nothing but an
inducement for prime contractors to discriminate against non-SDBs. That
difference in interpretation has been a source of contention, most notably in
Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena.20 1

19

Id. § 124.103(c)(2)(iii)(A).

9

Id. § 124.103(c)(2)(iii)(B).
Id § 124.103(c)(2)(iii)(C).

200
201

515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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The weight of evidence militates in support of characterization as a
"bonus." The basis for this conclusion is that the term "compensation" implies
a reimbursement for a sustained loss, whereas a "bonus" implies an additional
payment for an action and does not imply that a loss must be sustained.
Because the subcontractor compensation clause seemingly awards additional
payment to the prime contractor merely for hiring a SDB and does not mandate
any particularized showing that the prime contractor actually incurred any extra
expense as a result of hiring the SDB, characterization as a "bonus" is the more
appropriate of the two terms.
Once the subcontractor compensation clause is recognized as a bonus,
the logical inference is that the clause is further evidence that the Programs are
not narrowly tailored. Regarding the extent to which a subcontractor
compensation clause payment acts as a bonus, "it cannot be said to be narrowly
tailored to the government's interest of eliminating discriminatory barriers.
Rather, this aspect . .. results in the spending of public funds in a way202'which
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination."'
C.

Civil Rights Actions as a Check on DiscriminatoryHiringPractices

Effectively preventing future discrimination is not only a goal of the
SBA but is also a constitutional command. Because the Programs can be
viewed as government-sponsored discrimination against non-SDB certified
businesses, a more appropriate and narrowly tailored remedy is for firms that
have suffered discrimination to file an action for deprivation of contract rights
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866203 or violation of civil rights under the Civil
1In modern jurisprudence, the relevant provisions of these
Rights Act of 1871204
two Acts are respectively known as Section 1981 and Section 1983.
As originally enacted, Section 1981 gave "[a]ll persons born in the
United States . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts.

,,205

Congress added two new provisions to Section 1981 with the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.206 First, Congress defined and expanded the right to make and enforce
contracts to include "making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of
the contractual relationship." 207 More importantly, Congress clarified that the
right to make and enforce contracts is "protected against impairment by

202
Adarand IV, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1579-80 (D.
563, 569 (1974)), rev'd, Adarand Constructors, Inc.
203
14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
204
17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
205
206
207

Colo. 1997) (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
§ 1981 (2006)).

§ 1983).
14 Stat. 27, § 1.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6).
Id. § 101 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)).
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nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law."20 8
These two additions served to clarify that protection from discriminatory action
extends to all aspects of contractual relationships, both public and private.
A complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must allege specific acts of
discrimination based on race. 20 9 This requires that a plaintiff allege the
deprivation "of a right" that "under similar circumstances[] would have been
accorded to a person of a different race." 2 10 "Even under federal notice pleading
standards, a plaintiff must set forth facts, rather than conclusory allegations,
which give rise to a claim based on racial discrimination." 2 11
Section 1983 "applies to all identifiable classes and groups in the labor
market" 2 12 and included in the enforceable rights are violations of federal
statutes, such as the prohibition on employment discrimination by the federal
government.2121 Section 1983 makes equitable relief available to those who have
had their civil rights violated by the government or by an actor acting under
governmental authority.2 14 There are essentially "four major elements to a §
1983 claim: (a) conduct by a 'person'; (b) who acted under 'color of law'; (c)
[whose conduct proximately caused]; (d) a deprivation of federally protected
rights."215
Whether viewed separately or in conjunction, the plain language of
Section 1981 and Section 1983 provides redress for firms that have suffered
from racial discrimination by a federal prime contractor while seeking a
subcontract either because of the nature of the relationship, i.e., one of contract
formation, or because of the nature of the discrimination. The issue then
becomes whether a prime contractor that has suffered from discriminatory
action while seeking a contract directly from the federal government has any
redress due to the limitations on suits imposed by the doctrine of sovereign
21621
However, by utilizing provisions of the Tucker Act,217 firms
immunity.

Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 198 1(c)).
209
See Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., 475 F.2d 142, 145 (7th Cir. 1973).
210
See Willis v. Chicago Extruded Metals Co., 358 F. Supp. 848, 851 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
211 Ahmed v. Quinn, No. 95C6673 1996 WL 388418, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1996) (citations
omitted); see also McCormick v. City of Chicago, No. 95C2028, 1996 WL 401936, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. July 16, 1996) (citation omitted).
212
21 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 11.
213
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
214
id
215
Martin A Schwartz, FundamentalsofSection 1983 Litigation, in PLI's COURSE HANDBOOK
208

(22ND

ANNUAL

SECTION

1983

CIVIL

RIGHTS

LITIGATION)

5

(2005),

available at

http://www.pli.edu/emktg/toolbox/FundSecl98304.pdf (last accessed Nov. 6, 2012).
216
For the limited discussion of sovereign immunity contained in this Note, it can be
understood as "without an act of Congress no direct proceeding can be instituted against the
government or its property." Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433, 437 (1878). For a detailed
discussion of federal sovereign immunity, see JOHN LOBATO & JEFFREY THEODORE, HARVARD
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against whom the federal government has discriminated could circumvent the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and appropriately bring a Section 1981 action
against the federal government.
The Tucker Act is a jurisdictional statute that provides in relevant part
that:
(a)(1) The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the UnitedStates, or
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort.
(b)(1) Both the United States Court of Federal Claims and the
district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting
to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a
proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a
contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in
connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.219

The Tucker Act essentially gives jurisdiction to the United States Court
of Federal Claims for all claims flowing from contracts to which the federal
government is a party. However, an action under Section 1981 need not result
from a consummated contractual relationship; as a result of the amendments
included in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the cause of action may flow from
negotiations regarding the contract. 2 20 Therefore, if a firm can show that it
would have been awarded a contract but for the federal government's
discriminatory action, then the Court of Federal Claims could find that it has
jurisdiction under either of two distinct theories. First, the court could find an
implied-in-law contract for equitable purposes, thus satisfying the Tucker Act's
requirement of a "contract" with the United States and allow suit under 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The court could also find the discriminatory action that
interfered with the contract's formation constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981 and allow suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). Under either theory, the firm

LAW SCH.: FED. BUDGET POLICY SEMINAR, BRIEF PAPER No. 21: FEDERAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
(May 14, 2006), available at http://www.1aw.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/FedSovereign_ 21.pdf.
217
24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006)).
218
219
220

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1491(b)(1) (emphasis added).
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2006)).
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that suffered the discrimination should have an actionable claim against the
federal government, despite the doctrine of sovereign immunity.22 1
VI. CONCLUSION

Issues surrounding race and equality permeate the history of the United
States, and federal contract procurement and acquisition regulations are
certainly an area where such issues often take center stage. Although the
drafters of the Programs were well-intentioned, they created a constitutional
anomaly that is virtually unassailable. However, the Programs can be brought
back into constitutional congruence through a few simple changes. First,
abandoning the presumption of social disadvantage and instead implementing a
need-based assessment will do much to alleviate constitutional concerns. The
subcontracting clause, which creates a bonus for firms that hire SDBs, should
be eliminated to level the field among all subcontractors. Finally, if these two
suggestions are implemented, current statutory provisions provide adequate
disincentives to ensure racial discrimination is eliminated.
Answers to the questions generated by the Programs are impossible to
objectively answer. How much discrimination is enough? What races should be
included? Excluded? Should ethnic minorities of the racial majority be
included? What is race? Depending on who you ask, the answers will always be
different, and because the spectrum of conceivable answers is infinite, we must
reassess the continued viability of the Programs under the broad principle of
equality embodied by the United States Constitution.
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